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1 
Essay 
The Constitution in the National 
Surveillance State 
Jack M. Balkin† 
Late in 2005, the New York Times reported that the Bush 
administration had ordered the National Security Agency 
(NSA) to eavesdrop on telephone conversations by persons in 
the United States in order to obtain information that might 
help combat terrorist attacks.1 The secret NSA program oper-
ated outside of the restrictions on government surveillance im-
posed by the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)2 
and is thought to be only one of several such programs.3 In 
2007, Congress temporarily amended FISA to increase the 
 
†  Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, 
Yale Law School. This essay was originally given as the William B. Lockhart 
Lecture at the University of Minnesota Law School on October 10, 2006. My 
thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Orin Kerr, Seth Kreimer, Sandy Levinson, Tracey 
Meares, and Tal Zarsky for comments on a previous draft, and to Leah Belsky 
for research assistance. Copyright © 2008 by Jack M. Balkin. 
 1. James Risen, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, at A1. See generally JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE 
SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 39–60 (2006). 
On January 17, 2007, Attorney General Gonzales wrote to Senators Pa-
trick Leahy and Arlen Specter, respectively the Chairman and Ranking Mi-
nority Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stating that the adminis-
tration would conduct the Terrorist Surveillance Program under the approval 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court using new “complex” and “inno-
vative” court orders. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., to Pa-
trick Leahy and Arlen Specter, Senators (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http:// 
www.talkingpointsmemo.com/docs/nsa-doj-surveillance/. 
 2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 
Stat. 26 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
 3. On the variety of NSA domestic surveillance programs, which blur the 
line between domestic and foreign intelligence, see Siobhan Gorman, NSA’s 
Domestic Spying Grows As Agency Sweeps Up Data, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 
2008, at A1 (describing the NSA’s monitoring of a wide range of personal data 
from credit card transactions and e-mail to Internet searches and travel 
records, as well as “an ad-hoc collection of so-called ‘black programs’ whose ex-
istence is undisclosed”). 
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President’s power to listen in on conversations where at least 
one party is reasonably believed to be outside the United 
States.4 In June 2008, Congress passed a new set of amend-
ments to FISA, which allow the President to engage in a broad 
range of electronic surveillance without seeking warrants 
against particular individual targets of surveillance.5 At the 
same time, Congress effectively immunized telecommunica-
tions companies that had participated in the secret NSA pro-
gram.6 
In July 2007, New York City announced that it planned to 
mount thousands of cameras throughout Lower Manhattan to 
monitor vehicles and individuals.7 Some cameras will be able to 
photograph and read license plates and send out alerts for sus-
picious cars.8 The system of cameras will link to a series of pi-
voting gates installed at critical intersections, giving govern-
ment officials the ability to block off traffic through electronic 
commands.9 New York’s new plan—called the Lower Manhat-
tan Security Initiative—is based on London’s “Ring of Steel,” a 
security and surveillance system around London’s central core 
that features thousands of surveillance cameras.10 New York is 
hardly alone;11 the Department of Homeland Security has been 
quietly channeling millions of dollars to local governments 
around the country to create hi-tech camera networks that can 
be linked with private surveillance systems.12 
 
 4. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007). 
 5. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436, 2437–78 (2008) (to be codified in 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1801–12). 
 6. §§ 801–04, 122 Stat. 2467–70. 
 7. Cara Buckley, Police Plan Web of Surveillance for Downtown, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2007, at A1. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Michael McCahill & Clive Norris, CCTV in London 6–11 (Urba-
neye, Ctr. For Criminology and Criminal Justice, Univ. of Hull, Working Pa-
per No. 6, 2002), available at http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp6.pdf; 
SURVEILLANCE STUDIES NETWORK, A REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 
(2006), http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/ 
practical_application/surveillance_society_full_report_2006.pdf; Manav Tan-
neeru, ‘Ring of Steel’ Coming to New York, CNN, Aug. 3, 2007, http://www.cnn 
.com/2007/TECH/08/01/nyc.surveillance/index.html. 
 11. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of 
Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image 
and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1351–52 (2004) (noting the proliferation of 
cameras in New York, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Chicago). 
 12. Charlie Savage, United States Doles Out Millions for Street Cameras, 
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The secret NSA program and New York’s Lower Manhat-
tan Security Initiative reflect a larger trend in how govern-
ments do their jobs that predates the September 11, 2001 at-
tacks and the Bush administration’s declaration of a “war on 
terror.”13 During the last part of the twentieth century, the 
United States began developing a new form of governance that 
features the collection, collation, and analysis of information 
about populations both in the United States and around the 
world. This new form of governance is the National Surveil-
lance State. 
In the National Surveillance State, the government uses 
surveillance, data collection, collation, and analysis to identify 
problems, to head off potential threats, to govern populations, 
and to deliver valuable social services. The National Surveil-
lance State is a special case of the Information State—a state 
that tries to identify and solve problems of governance through 
the collection, collation, analysis, and production of informa-
tion. 
The war on terror may be the most familiar justification for 
the rise of the National Surveillance State,14 but it is hardly the 
sole or even the most important cause. Government’s increas-
ing use of surveillance and data mining is a predictable result 
of accelerating developments in information technology.15 As 
technologies that let us discover and analyze what is happening 
in the world become ever more powerful, both governments and 
private parties will seek to use them.16 
The question is not whether we will have a surveillance 
state in the years to come, but what sort of surveillance state 
 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2007, at A1 (“Since 2003, the Department has 
handed out some $23 billion in federal grants to local governments for equip-
ment and training to help combat terrorism . . . [including] millions on surveil-
lance cameras, transforming city streets and parks into places under constant 
observation.”). 
 13. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional 
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 490 (2006). 
 14. See Andrew Cohen, The Legal War on Terror: White House Describing 
Surveillance in Military Terms, CBS NEWS, Jan. 22, 2006, http://www.cbsnews 
.com/stories/2006/01/22/opinion/courtwatch/main1227481.shtml. 
 15. Cf. James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and Na-
tional Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1464–68 (2004). 
 16. See id. at 1468–69 (describing government use of privately collected 
data). See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-548, DATA MIN-
ING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf [hereinafter U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE] (reporting widespread use of privately collected data). 
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we will have. Will we have a government without sufficient 
controls over public and private surveillance, or will we have a 
government that protects individual dignity and conforms both 
public and private surveillance to the rule of law? 
The National Surveillance State is a way of governing. It is 
neither the product of emergency nor the product of war. War 
and emergency are temporary conditions. The National Surveil-
lance State is a permanent feature of governance, and will be-
come as ubiquitous in time as the familiar devices of the regu-
latory and welfare states.17 Governments will use surveillance, 
data collection, and data mining technologies not only to keep 
Americans safe from terrorist attacks but also to prevent ordi-
nary crime and deliver social services.18 In fact, even today, 
providing basic social services—like welfare benefits—and pro-
tecting key rights—like rights against employment discrimina-
tion—are difficult, if not impossible, without extensive data col-
lection and analysis.19 Moreover, much of the surveillance in 
the National Surveillance State will be conducted and analyzed 
by private parties.20 The increased demand for—and the in-
 
 17. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 13, at 520–23. 
 18. See id. at 525–26; see also Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: 
The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 440–44 
(2008). 
 19. While surveillance is usually portrayed as a tool for social control, it is 
also a means by which governments respect and realize citizenship to the ex-
tent that it enables the implementation of the welfare state and the rights and 
benefits that go with it. As David Lyon explains: 
[T]he surveillance systems of advanced bureaucratic nation-states are 
not so much the repressive machines that pessimists imply, but the 
outcome of aspirations and strivings for citizenship. If government 
departments are to treat people equally, . . . then those people must 
be individually identified. To exercise the right to vote, one’s name 
must appear on the electoral roll; to claim welfare benefits, personal 
details must be documented. Thus, . . . the individuation that treats 
people in their own right, rather than merely as members of families 
or communities, means “freedom from specific constraints but also 
greater opportunities for surveillance and control on the part of a cen-
tralized state.” 
See DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE 32-33 (1994) (quoting NICHOLAS AB-
ERCROMBIE, SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUALS OF CAPITALISM (1994)). 
Governments, of course, have long been in the business of collecting and 
analyzing statistics to facilitate governance. The famous Domesday Book, 
commissioned in 1086 by William the Conqueror, sought to assess the land 
and resources owned in England to facilitate tax collection in order to raise the 
necessary capital to support armies in defense of the realm. It included ex-
haustive compilations of landholders, their tenants, the properties they owned, 
and their values both before and after the Conquest, thus providing a snap-
shot of the country’s social and economic state. 
 20. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 16, at 11; Dempsey & 
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creased use of—public and private surveillance cannot be ex-
plained or justified solely in terms of war or emergency.21 
The National Surveillance State grows naturally out of the 
Welfare State and the National Security State; it is their logical 
successor. The Welfare State governs domestic affairs by spend-
ing and transferring money and by creating government en-
titlements, licenses, and public works.22 The National Security 
State23 promotes foreign policy through investments in defense 
 
Flint, supra note 15, at 1468–73 (describing government use of privately col-
lected data). 
 21. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 13, at 520–23 (“The National Surveil-
lance State arose from a number of different features whose effects are mu-
tually reinforcing. The most obvious causes are changes in how nations con-
duct war and promote their national security . . . . Equally important 
[however] . . . are new technologies of surveillance, data storage, and computa-
tion . . . .”). 
 22. Although the Welfare State as a mode of governance is often identified 
with the New Deal, its techniques and mechanisms arose earlier. See generally 
THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORI-
GINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992) (rooting contemporary 
principles of social welfare policy in nineteenth-century pension benefits for 
veterans and their families); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERI-
CAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–
1920 (1982) (describing the development of parts of the machinery of the mod-
ern state in the era before the New Deal). On the constitutional problems 
posed by the welfare state, see PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL DECISIONMAKING 1593–1800 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing constitutional 
disputes over rights to government services and benefits, unconstitutional 
conditions, and due process requirements); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE 
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 174–205 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2d ed. 1994) (dis-
cussing the constitutional implications of the rise of the welfare state in the 
twentieth century; materials on the Welfare State written by Sanford Levin-
son). 
 23. The National Security State arose in the wake of World War II in the 
context of the American struggle against the Soviet Union during the cold war. 
This required, among other things, substantial new investments in defense 
spending and military technology, the stationing of American forces around 
the world, and a new emphasis on intelligence capabilities. A characteristic 
piece of legislation is the National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 253, ch. 
343, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.), 
which reorganized the military and intelligence services and created the De-
partment of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. For historical accounts of the causes and growth of the National 
Security State, see MICHAEL J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON: HARRY S. TRUMAN 
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 1945–1954 (1998); DA-
NIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY STATE (1977). For legal and constitutional accounts, see 
William M. Wiecek, America in the Post-War Years: Transition and Transfor-
mation, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1203 (2000); William M. Wiecek, The Legal 
Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The Background of Dennis v. Unit-
ed States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375 (2001).  
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industries and defense-related technologies, through creating 
and expanding national intelligence agencies like the CIA and 
the NSA, and through the placement of American military 
forces and weapons systems around the globe to counter mili-
tary threats and project national power. 
The Welfare State created a huge demand for data 
processing technologies to identify individuals—think about all 
the uses for your Social Security Number—and deliver social 
services like licenses, benefits, and pensions.24 The National 
Security State created the need for effective intelligence collec-
tion and data analysis.25 It funded the development of increa-
singly powerful technologies for surveillance, data collection, 
and data mining, not to mention increasingly powerful comput-
er and telecommunications technologies.26 American invest-
ments in defense technologies spurred the electronics industry, 
 
 24. The United States government played an important role in promoting 
the development of data processing technology. A former office worker for the 
census, Herman Hollerith, invented the computer punch card to help tabulate 
statistics about populations in the United States. SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATA-
BASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 17 (2000). The 
tabulating machine company Hollerith founded eventually became known as 
the International Business Machine Company, or IBM. Id. at 18. The creation 
of the modern welfare state, with its vast array of new government employees 
and beneficiaries of government programs, created a demand for the services 
of IBM and similar companies, and the Social Security number eventually be-
came a central identifier for the federal and state governments. Initially 
created to provide unique identifiers for all individuals collecting benefits, so-
cial security numbers were then adopted by many states for administration of 
income taxes, drivers licenses, student IDs, and library cards. Eventually the 
private sector began to use the numbers for consumer credit reporting. Id. at 
19–25, 33; see also SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., PUBL’N. NO. 21-059, SOCIAL SE-
CURITY: A BRIEF HISTORY (2007), available at www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/2005 
pamphlet.pdf.  
Similar developments occurred in Europe, as record-keeping requirements 
morphed from providing proof of identity to underpinning personal rights and 
governmental obligations, including pensions and allowances for families of 
military personnel. The expansion of the welfare state created a need for sta-
tistics to facilitate planning of delivery of social services, for letting citizens 
know about services available to them, for enforcing traffic laws, and for iden-
tifying criminal suspects. See Edward Higgs, The Rise of the Information 
State: The Development of Central State Surveillance of the Citizen in Eng-
land, 1500–2000, 14 J. HIST. SOC. 175, 185–86 (2001). 
 25. See Cate, supra note 18, at 444–52. 
 26. See id. at 456–59. See generally JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: 
RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE (2004) (exploring 
the threats to privacy and promotion of social conformity through emerging 
surveillance technology). 
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the computer industry, and eventually, the birth of the Internet 
itself.27 
By the time the Internet went commercial in the mid-
1990s, the National Surveillance State was already well in 
gear. Telecommunications, computing, data storage, and sur-
veillance technologies have become ever more potent, while 
their costs have steadily declined.28 It is unthinkable that gov-
ernments would not seek to use these technologies to promote 
the public good; it is even more unthinkable that private par-
ties would not try to harness them as well. In fact, much, if not 
most surveillance and information collection these days is in 
private hands. Corporations invest heavily in security and sur-
veillance, especially to protect sensitive information in their 
computer networks.29 Private security cameras still outnumber 
those operated by the government.30 Many businesses make 
money from collecting, analyzing, and selling consumer data; in 
fact, governments increasingly purchase information from cor-
porations instead of collecting it themselves.31 
In the National Surveillance State, the line between public 
and private modes of surveillance and security has blurred if 
not vanished. Public and private enterprises are thoroughly in-
tertwined.32 The NSA program would be impossible without the 
 
 27. See Internet Society, A Brief History of the Internet and Related Net-
works (2007), http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/cerf.shtml. 
 28. See Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 137, 142–53 (2008) (describing trends which “make indefinite da-
ta retention feasible for businesses and individuals alike”). 
 29. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. GORDON ET AL., COMPUTER SECURITY INSTI-
TUTE, COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY SURVEY 5–6 (2006), available at http:// 
i.cmpnet.com/gocsi/db_area/pdfs/fbi/FBI2006.pdf. 
 30. See Dean E. Murphy, As Security Cameras Sprout, Someone’s Always 
Watching, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2002, at A33 (“The Security Industry Associa-
tion estimates that at least two million closed-circuit television systems are in 
the United States. A survey of Manhattan in 1998 by the American Civil Li-
berties Union found 2,397 cameras fixed on places where people pass or gath-
er, like stores and sidewalks. All but 270 were operated by private entities, the 
organization reported. CCS International, a company that provides security 
and monitoring services, calculated last year that the average person was rec-
orded 73 to 75 times a day in New York City.”). 
 31. See JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE SURVEILLANCE-
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS CONSCRIPTING 
BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SURVEILLANCE SO-
CIETY 12, 26 (2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/surveillance_ 
report.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 16, at 8–11. 
 32. See, e.g., ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 1–10 (2005) (de-
tailing links of cooperation between private information collection industries 
and government); Dempsey & Flint, supra note 15, at 1468–70 (noting gov-
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assistance of telecommunications companies; the government 
now requires that new communications technologies be de-
signed with back ends that facilitate government surveil-
lance.33 Federal programs also encourage linking private secu-
rity cameras with comprehensive government systems like 
those planned in Manhattan.34 Corporate data collectors and 
commercial data mining operations are a major source of in-
formation on individuals’ tastes, preferences, histories, and be-
haviors that governments can harness.35 Government and 
businesses are increasingly partners in surveillance, data min-
ing, and information analysis.36 Moreover, the architecture of 
the Internet—and the many possible methods of attack—
requires governments, corporations, and private parties to 
 
ernment use of commercial data for intelligence and counterterrorism purpos-
es). 
 33. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CA-
LEA), Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–10 
(2006)). CALEA mandates that telecommunications services design their 
technology so it can be wiretapped by the government pursuant to a lawful au-
thorization or a court order, in a manner which enables the government to 
access call-identifying information, and which allows the transmission of the 
intercepted information to the government. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1); see Michael 
D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence 
of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH 6, para. 84 (2003); 
Emily Hancock, CALEA: Does One Size Still Fit All?, in CYBERCRIME: DIGITAL 
COPS IN A NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT 184–203 (Jack M. Balkin et al. eds., 
2007) [hereinafter CYBERCRIME]. 
 34. See Buckley, supra note 7 (describing coordination of public and pri-
vate cameras in Lower Manhattan Security Initiative). 
 35. See Cate, supra note 18, at 435 (explaining how “advances in digital 
technology have greatly expanded the volume of personal data created as indi-
viduals engage in everday activities”). 
 36. See, e.g., Verne Kopytoff, Google Now Has a Lot More To Do With In-
telligence, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 30, 2008, at C6 (detailing Google’s multiple ser-
vices for the government). According to Kopytoff, Google’s customers include 
not only the intelligence agencies, but also “the National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, the State of Alabama and Washington D.C.” Id. 
It sells “virtually the same products to companies as it does to government 
agencies.” Id.; see also ROSEN, supra note 26, at 108 (explaining how Silicon 
Valley companies work with the government to enable data collection tech-
niques and other new technologies to serve government). Silicon Valley entre-
preneurs, Rosen reports, are working toward a “killer app” useful for both 
business and for national security that “will allow government agencies to 
access and share information about Americans that is currently stored in dif-
ferent databases—from our chat-room gossip to our shopping history to our 
parking tickets, and perhaps even to our payment history for child-support 
checks.” Id. at 107. 
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work together to protect network security and head off threats 
before they occur.37 
Increased focus on surveillance and prevention becomes in-
evitable once digital information technologies become widely 
dispersed. Criminal organizations and terrorist groups can use 
many of the same information and surveillance technologies 
that governments and legitimate businesses do.38 Terrorist 
groups that lack fixed addresses can use new information tech-
nologies to communicate and plan assaults.39 Hackers can at-
tack networks from afar.40 A new breed of criminals employs 
digital networks to commit old-fashioned crimes like embez-
zlement and to commit new crimes like identity theft and deni-
al of service attacks.41 Cyberattacks can not only bring down 
financial institutions; they can also target the nation’s defense 
systems.42 Digital technologies simultaneously pose new prob-
 
 37. For example, the FBI’s InfraGard program seeks cooperation between 
government, business, and academia to protect computer networks and Inter-
net infrastructure. InfraGard, About InfraGard, http://www.infragard.net/ 
about.php?mn=1&sm=1-0 (last visited Oct. 14, 2008); see also Current and 
Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Before the S. Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. 33 (2005) (statement of Robert S. Mueller, 
III, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ 
congress/congress05/mueller021605.htm (describing a central mission of the 
FBI as “proactively target[ing] threats to the US, inhibiting them, and dis-
suading them before they become crimes”). 
 38. E.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT 55–57 (2008) (describing 
how new information technologies facilitate international terrorism). 
 39. See id.; GABRIEL WEIMANN, TERROR ON THE INTERNET 106 (2006) (de-
scribing Al Qaeda’s use of the Internet); Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the 
Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism, 27 INT’L SECURITY 30, 46–
48 (2002–03) (explaining challenges created by changes in means, methods 
and organization of terrorist networks due to new technology); Robert F. 
Worth, TheirSpace, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at 21 (reviewing WEIMANN, 
supra). 
 40. See BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 95; Daniel E. Geer, Jr., The Physics of 
Digital Law: Searching for Counterintuitive Analogies, in CYBERCRIME, supra 
note 33, at 13–36. 
 41. See BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 55–57; Scott Charney, The Internet, 
Law Enforcement, and Security, in 2 PRACTICING L. INST., FIFTH ANNUAL LAW 
INSTITUTE 943–44 (Ian C. Ballon et al. eds., 2001) (detailing the increasing 
vulnerabilities and threats to the state that are enabled by new technologies); 
Geer, supra note 40 (noting basic problems of network security that facilitate 
attacks); Doreen Carvajal, High-Tech Crime Is an Online Bubble That Hasn’t 
Burst, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008, at C2.  
 42. See, e.g., O’HARROW, supra note 32, at 10 (noting that while America’s 
technological capability could serve as a weapon abroad, its use could also 
“spin out of control” in the hands of enemies). 
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lems for governments and create new opportunities for identify-
ing threats and meeting them in advance.43 
Older models of law enforcement have focused on appre-
hension and prosecution of wrongdoers after the fact and the 
threat of criminal or civil sanctions to deter future bad beha-
vior.44 The National Surveillance State supplements this model 
of prosecution and deterrence with technologies of prediction 
and prevention. Computer security tries to identify potential 
weaknesses and block entry by suspicious persons before they 
have a chance to strike.45 Private companies and government 
agencies use databases to develop profiles of individuals who 
are likely to violate laws, drive up costs, or cause problems, and 
then deflect them, block them, or deny them benefits, access, or 
opportunities.46 The government’s “No Fly” and “Selectee” 
watch lists and its still-planned Secure Flight screening pro-
gram collect information on passengers and create profiles that 
seek to block dangerous people from boarding planes.47 Gover-
 
 43. See BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 55–58. 
 44. See, e.g., Charney, supra note 41, at 944 (discussing the traditional 
model of law enforcement before the advent of new information technologies). 
 45. See Geer, supra note 40, at 14–15 (providing an overview of how com-
puter security systems deal with risks posed by hackers). 
 46. See, e.g., Cate, supra note 18, at 442–44 (describing how the FBI uses 
various databases for law enforcement). 
 47. For descriptions of the “No Fly” and “Selectee” watch lists, see Trans-
portation Security Administration (TSA): Frequently Asked Questions, http:// 
www.tsa.gov/research/privacy/faqs.shtm (last visited Oct. 14, 2008); 60 Mi-
nutes: Unlikely Terrorists on No Fly List (CBS television broadcast Oct. 8, 
2006), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/05/60minutes/ 
main2066624.shtml; see also 49 U.S.C. § 114(h) (Supp. V 2006) (creating sta-
tutory authorization for creation of these passenger lists). These watch lists, in 
turn, are subsets of a much larger Terrorist Screening Database. See Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Terrorist Screening Center: Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterrorism/faqs.htm (last visited Oct. 
14, 2008). 
The TSA has been working on a more elaborate system, the Secure Flight 
Screening Program, for some time. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 § 4012, 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(A) (Supp. V 2006) (di-
recting the Secretary of Transportation to “ensure that the Computer-Assisted 
Passenger Prescreening System, or any successor system—(i) is used to eva-
luate all passengers before they board an aircraft”). Its predecessor, the auto-
mated Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II), was 
suspended in August 2004 due to strong criticism, and was replaced by Secure 
Flight, whose implementation, in turn, has been delayed due to public criti-
cism. See, e.g., Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May 
Adversely Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administra-
tion’s Secure Flight Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. 8–11 (2006) (statement of Cathleen 
A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues), available at 
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nance in the National Surveillance State is increasingly statis-
tically oriented, ex ante and preventative, rather than focused 
on deterrence and ex post prosecution of individual wrong-
doing.48 Such tendencies have been around for at least a cen-
tury, but new technologies for surveillance, data analysis, and 
regulation by computer code and physical architecture have 
made them far easier to put into effect. 
The National Surveillance State seeks any and all informa-
tion that assists governance; electronic surveillance is not its 
only tool. Governments can also get information out of human 
bodies, for example, through collection and analysis of DNA, 
through locational tracking, and through facial recognition sys-
tems.49 The Bush administration’s detention and interrogation 
practices seek to get information out of human bodies through 
old-fashioned detention and interrogation techniques, including 
techniques that are tantamount to torture.50 In the National 
 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06374t.pdf; Matthew L. Wald & John 
Schwartz, Screening Plans Went Beyond Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 
2004, at A35 (detailing how the Department of Homeland Security attempted 
to expand the CAPPS II program to serve broader police purposes); Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, Spotlight on Surveillance: Secure Flight Should 
Remain Grounded Until Security and Privacy Problems Are Resolved (2007), 
http://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0807/default.html. 
 48. As Nimrod Kozlovski explains: 
The new policing aims to prevent and preempt crime rather than to 
prosecute it. By predicting when, how, and by whom a crime will be 
committed, it aims to enable efficient intervention. Automated tools 
constantly monitor the environment to match users’ risk profiles 
against dynamically identified patterns of criminal behavior. Patterns 
of previous computer crimes are coded as “crime signatures.” These 
“signatures” . . . monitor for anomalies or deviations from “normal” 
behavior. The patterns of “normal” behavior are coded and an algo-
rithm watches for a certain level of deviation from them. The systems 
aim to be able to disarm the attacker, redirect his actions to a “safe 
zone,” block or modify his communication, or even strike back. 
Nimrod Kozlovski, Designing Accountable Online Policing, in CYBERCRIME, 
supra note 33, at 110. 
 49. See, e.g., Noah Shachtman, The New Security: Cameras That Never 
Forget Your Face, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at G6 (describing the use of facial 
recognition systems in New York City); Grant Gross, Lockheed Wins 10-year 
FBI Biometric Contract, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2008, http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/13/AR2008021301655_pf 
.html (detailing the rise of biometric systems). 
 50. See Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 30, 2005, at A1 (explaining the origins of interrogation program 
and “authorized techniques,” such as waterboarding, hard slapping, isolation, 
sleep deprivation, liquid diets, and stress positions); Brian Ross & Richard Es-
posito, CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described, ABC NEWS (Nov. 18, 
2005), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1322866 (describing 
additional interrogation techniques—forced standing, hypothermia, and noise 
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Surveillance State, bodies are not simply objects of governance; 
they are rich sources of information that governments can mine 
through a multitude of different technologies and techniques. 
Decades ago Michel Foucault argued that modern societies 
had become increasingly focused on watching and measuring 
people in order to control them, to normalize their behavior and 
to make them docile and obedient.51 His famous example was 
Jeremy Bentham’s idea of a Panopticon—a prison designed so 
that the prisoners could always be watched but would not know 
exactly when.52 By making surveillance ubiquitous, govern-
ments and private organizations could discourage behavior 
they deemed unusual or abnormal. 
Today’s National Surveillance State goes beyond Foucault’s 
Panoptic model. Government’s most important technique of 
control is no longer watching or threatening to watch. It is ana-
lyzing and drawing connections between data. Much public and 
private surveillance occurs without any knowledge that one is 
watched. More to the point, data mining technologies allow the 
state and business enterprises to record perfectly innocent be-
havior that no one is particularly ashamed of and draw surpri-
singly powerful inferences about people’s behavior, beliefs, and 
attitudes.53 Over time, these tools will only become more effec-
tive. We leave traces of ourselves continually, including our lo-
cation, our communications contacts, our consumption choic-
es—even our DNA. 
 
bombardment); Associated Press, White House Defends Use of Waterboarding, 
MSNBC (Feb. 6, 2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23030663/ (revealing 
that President had ordered waterboarding in the past and might do so again); 
see also Dana Priest, Officials Relieved Secret Is Shared, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 
2006, at A17 [hereinafter Priest, Officials Relieved] (describing revelation of 
secret CIA black sites); Jan Crawford Greenburg et al., Sources: Top Bush Ad-
visors Approved ‘Enhanced Interrogation,’ ABC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2008), http:// 
abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/LawPolitics/story?id=4583256&page=1 (describing 
how senior Bush administration officials discussed and approved “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” to be used against high-value detainees). 
 51. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 195–217 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (describing the rise of the discip-
linary society). 
 52. See id. at 200–02 (discussing Bentham’s idea of a Panopticon). 
 53. See Kozlovski, supra note 48, at 114 (“Investigators increasingly focus 
on ‘noncontent’ data such as traffic data and automated system logs, enabling 
them to create maps of associations, and to visualize non-trivial connections 
among events.”); Gorman, supra note 3 (explaining that NSA “now monitors . . 
. domestic emails and Internet searches as well as bank transfers, credit-card 
transactions, travel and telephone records” received from private companies or 
other agencies, which are analyzed for suspicious patterns). 
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Data mining allows inferences not only about the direct 
subjects of surveillance, but about other people with whom they 
live, work, and communicate.54 Instead of spying on a particu-
lar person, data about other persons combined with public facts 
about a person can allow governments and private businesses 
to draw increasingly powerful inferences about that person’s 
motives, desires, and behaviors.55 
The problem today is not that fear of surveillance will lead 
people to docile conformity, but rather that even the most inno-
cent and seemingly unimportant behaviors can increase know-
ledge about both ourselves and others.56 Normal behavior does 
not merely acquiesce to the state’s power; it may actually ampl-
ify it, adding information to databases that makes inferences 
more powerful and effective. Our behavior may tell things 
about us that we may not even know about ourselves. In addi-
tion, knowledge about some people can generate knowledge 
about others who are not being directly watched. Individuals 
can no longer protect themselves simply by preventing the gov-
ernment from watching them, for the government may no long-
er need to watch them to gain knowledge that can be used 
against them. 
Equally important, the rise of the National Surveillance 
State portends the death of amnesia. In practice, much privacy 
protection depends on forgetting. When people display unusual 
or embarrassing behavior, or participate in political protests in 
public places, their most effective protection may be that most 
people don’t know who they are and will soon forget who did 
what at a certain time and place. But cameras, facial recogni-
tion systems, and location tracking systems let governments 
 
 54. See Gorman, supra note 3 (discussing social network analysis and oth-
er data analysis techniques). See generally Dempsey & Flint, supra note 15, at 
1464–66 (explaining pattern-based searching and link analysis). 
 55. See Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Data Mining Reached Beyond Initial Tar-
gets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, at A1 (describing the practice of “link analy-
sis”). 
 56. See Dempsey & Flint, supra note 15, at 1464 (explaining that the 
point of data mining is to search “based on the premise that the planning of 
terrorist activity creates a pattern or ‘signature’ that can be found in the ocean 
of transactional data created in the course of everyday life”); Ira S. Rubinstein 
et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling, Emerging Regulatory and Technol-
ogical Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 261 (2007) (“[T]o identify and 
preempt terrorist activity, intelligence agencies have begun collecting, retain-
ing, and analyzing voluminous and largely banal transactional information 
about the daily activities of hundreds of millions of people.”); Ellen Nakashi-
ma, From Casinos to Counterterrorism, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2007, at A1 (de-
scribing data mining and surveillance techniques of casinos). 
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and businesses compile continuous records of what happens at 
particular locations, which can be collated with records of dif-
ferent times and places. The collation and analysis of events al-
lows public and private actors to create locational and temporal 
profiles of people, making it easier to trace and predict their 
behaviors.57 Older surveillance cameras featured imprecise, 
grainy images, and the recordings were quickly taped over. 
New digital systems offer ever greater fidelity and precision,58 
and the declining cost of digital storage means that records of 
events can be maintained indefinitely and copied and distri-
buted widely to other surveillance systems around the country 
or even around the globe.59 Ordinary citizens can no longer as-
sume that what they do will be forgotten; rather, records will 
be stored and collated with other information collected at other 
times and places.60 The greatest single protector of privacy—
amnesia—will soon be a thing of the past. As technology im-
 
 57. See Nakashima, supra note 56 (describing how a casino investigator 
can assemble a mosaic of visitor’s moves for the past two weeks; this technolo-
gy is used to better target high rollers for special treatment and others for 
promotions).  
 58. See New YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHO’S WATCHING?: VIDEO 
CAMERA SURVEILLANCE IN NEW YORK CITY AND THE NEED FOR PUBLIC OVER-
SIGHT 7 (2006), http://www.nyclu.org/pdfs/surveillance_cams_report_121306 
.pdf (describing cameras today as having a “super-human” vision, including 
capabilities to tilt, pan, and rotate to better follow an individual, and capabili-
ty to zoom to see the pages of a book or even a text message on a screen of a 
cell phone).  
 59. See Bellia, supra note 28, at 141 (describing trends toward an “archi-
tecture of perfect memory” where low cost of storing vast quantities of data 
and ease of conversion of nondigital information to digital form remove many 
of the incentives to destroy data, increasingly held by third parties); Robert 
O’Harrow Jr. & Ellen Nakashima, National Dragnet Is a Click Away, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 6, 2008, at A1 (reporting on the new N-DEx database intended to 
become a “one-stop shop” enabling federal law enforcement, counterterrorism 
and intelligence analysts to automatically examine the enormous caches of lo-
cal and state records); Walter Pincus, NSA Gave Other Agencies Info from 
Surveillance, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2005, at A8 (“Information captured by the 
National Security Agency’s secret eavesdropping . . . has been passed on to 
other government agencies, which cross-check the information with tips and 
information collected in other databases . . . .”). 
 60. See Saul Hansell, U.S. Wants Internet Companies to Keep Web-Surfing 
Records, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2006, at A15 (reporting on Justice Department’s 
request to Internet companies to retain records on the Web-surfing and email 
activities of their customers for up to two years); O’Harrow & Nakashima, su-
pra note 59 (describing commercial data-mining system used by police investi-
gators to “find hidden relationships among suspects and instantly map links 
among people, places, and events”); Pincus, supra note 59 (revealing that other 
agencies used “records obtained from NSA in combination with wide-ranging 
databases to look for links and associations”). 
 2008] NATIONAL SURVEILLANCE STATE 15 
 
proves and storage costs decline, the National Surveillance 
State becomes the State that Never Forgets.61 
The National Surveillance State poses three major dangers 
for our freedom. Because the National Surveillance State em-
phasizes ex ante prevention rather than ex post apprehension 
and prosecution, the first danger is that government will create 
a parallel track of preventative law enforcement that routes 
around the traditional guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The 
Bush administration’s military detention practices and its NSA 
surveillance program are two examples. The administration 
justified detaining and interrogating people—including Ameri-
can citizens—in ways that would have violated traditional legal 
restraints on the grounds that it was not engaged in ordinary 
criminal law enforcement.62 It sought intelligence that would 
prevent future attacks and wanted to prevent terrorists from 
returning to the battlefield.63 Similarly, the administration de-
fended warrantless surveillance of people in the United States 
by arguing that the President was not engaged in criminal 
prosecutions but in collection of military intelligence designed 
to fight terrorism.64 
 
 61. See Bellia, supra note 28, at 137–38, 148–49 (noting that our surveil-
lance and information privacy laws say little about data retention and that 
much of what they say provides incentives for indefinite retention). 
 62. See Military Order No. 222, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Cer-
tain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 
2001) (ordering the detention of persons whom the President has reason to be-
lieve (1) are current or former members of al-Qaeda, (2) have engaged in, 
aided, abetted, or conspired to commit terrorist acts or are preparing to do so, 
or (3) have harbored such a person, and delegating the authority over trials of 
these individuals to military commissions under the purview of the Secretary 
of Defense); Brief for the Respondents at 16, Yaser Esam Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696) (justifying the detention of Hamdi, a United 
States citizen, as the capture of “a classic battlefield detainee”). 
 63. See Priest, Officials Relieved, supra note 50 (reporting the CIA’s asser-
tion that it needed “to harshly interrogate prisoners to extract time-sensitive 
information about possible terrorists attacks”); David Stout, Rumsfeld Defends 
Plan to Hold War Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002, at A18 (reporting a 
statement of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld that preventing Afghan 
war prisoners from returning to the battlefield was justification for a plan to 
hold some prisoners even if they were acquitted in military tribunals); Press 
Release, President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military 
Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006) (defending detention 
and interrogation practices necessary to gain intelligence to stop terrorist at-
tacks and arguing that “we have an obligation to the American people, to de-
tain these enemies and stop them from rejoining the battle”). 
 64. See Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t 
of Justice, to the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence and House Permanent 
Select Comm. on Intelligence (Dec. 22, 2005), reprinted in 81 IND. L.J. 1360, 
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The second danger posed by the National Surveillance 
State is that traditional law enforcement and social services 
will increasingly resemble the parallel track. Once govern-
ments have access to powerful surveillance and data mining 
technologies, there will be enormous political pressure to use 
them in everyday law enforcement and for delivery of govern-
ment services. If data mining can help us locate terrorists, why 
not use it to find deadbeat dads, or even people who have not 
paid their parking tickets?65 If surveillance technologies signal 
that certain people are likely threats to public order, why not 
create a system of preventive detention outside the ordinary 
criminal justice system?66 Why not impose sanctions outside 
the criminal law, like denying people the right to board air-
planes or use public facilities and transportation systems? And 
if DNA analysis can identify people who will likely impose high 
costs on public resources, why not identify them in advance and 
exclude them from public programs and other opportunities? 
The more powerful and effective our technologies of surveil-
lance and analysis become, the more pressure the government 
will feel to route around warrant requirements and other pro-
cedural hurdles so that it can catch potential troublemakers 
more effectively and efficiently before they have a chance to 
cause any harm. 
Private power and public-private cooperation pose a third 
danger. Because the Constitution does not reach private par-
ties, government has increasing incentives to rely on private 
 
1363 (2006) (characterizing communication intercepts by NSA as falling into a 
category of “special needs” outside the ordinary criminal process); U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security 
Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), reprinted in 81 IND. L.J. 
1374, 1410–12 (2006) [hereinafter Legal Authorities] (“[C]ollecting foreign in-
telligence is far removed from the ordinary criminal law enforcement action to 
which the warrant requirement is particularly suited.”). 
 65. For discussions of “mission creep” in the use of data mining and sur-
veillance technologies, see MARY DEROSA, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L 
STUDIES, DATA MINING AND DATA ANALYSIS FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 16 
(2004), http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300csis.pdf; TECHNOLOGY 
& PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST 
TERRORISM 39–40 (2004), available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/ 
20040300tapac.pdf. 
 66. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists’ Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19 (proposing “a comprehensive system of pre-
ventive detention” overseen by a national security court, which could use evi-
dence “too difficult to present in open civilian court without compromising in-
telligence sources and methods”). 
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enterprise to collect and generate information for it.67 Corpo-
rate business models, in turn, lead companies to amass and 
analyze more and more information about people in order to 
target new customers and reject undesirable ones. As compu-
ting power increases and storage costs decline, companies will 
seek to know more and more about their customers and sell 
this valuable information to other companies and to the gov-
ernment. 
If some form of the National Surveillance State is inevita-
ble, how do we continue to protect individual rights and consti-
tutional government? Today’s challenge is similar to that faced 
during the first half of the twentieth century, when government 
transitioned into the Welfare State and the National Security 
State. Americans had to figure out how to tame these new 
forms of governance within constitutional boundaries. It is no 
accident that this period spawned both the New Deal—with its 
vast increase in government power—and the Civil Rights Revo-
lution. The more power the state amasses, the more Americans 
need constitutional guarantees to keep governments honest 
and devoted to the public good. 
We might begin by distinguishing between an authorita-
rian information state and a democratic information state.68 
Authoritarian information states are information gluttons and 
information misers. Like gluttons they grab as much informa-
tion as possible because this helps maximize their power. Au-
thoritarian states are information misers because they try to 
keep the information they collect—and their own operations—
secret from the public. They try to treat everything that might 
 
 67. See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 33, para. 41, 43 (explaining 
that online service providers are being recruited to serve governmental pur-
poses because “they are not tied, nor restricted, to any national border” and 
because they are also “more flexible in watching online activities since they 
are not subject to the same scrutiny which applies to the State and its 
agents”); see also Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveil-
lance, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1142 (2006) (listing the wide range 
of personal data traded by the private sector, access to which is also purchased 
by government agencies); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and 
the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 320 (2008) (“[M]any [govern-
ment] programs rely in whole or in part on private companies, called commer-
cial data brokers, to provide their input, which is then analyzed by govern-
ment officials.”). 
 68. Cf. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 23–26 (1967) (distin-
guishing between authoritarian and democratic models of privacy); Lewis 
Mumford, Authoritarian and Democratic Technics, 5 TECH. & CULTURE 1, 1–8 
(1964) (noting a long historical dialectic between “authoritarian” and “demo-
cratic” modes of technological development). 
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embarrass them or undermine their authority as state secrets, 
and they multiply secret rules and regulations, which lets them 
claim to obey the law without having to account for what they 
do. In this way they avoid accountability for violating people’s 
rights and for their own policy failures. Thus, information glut-
tony and information miserliness are two sides of the same 
coin: both secure governments’ power by using information to 
control their populations, to prevent inquiry into their own op-
erations, to limit avenues of political accountability, and to faci-
litate self-serving propaganda.69 
By contrast, democratic information states are information 
gourmets and information philanthropists. Like gourmets they 
collect and collate only the information they need to ensure ef-
ficient government and national security. They do not keep tabs 
on citizens without justifiable reasons; they create a regular 
system of checks and procedures to avoid abuse. They stop col-
lecting information when it is no longer needed and they dis-
card information at regular intervals to protect privacy. When 
it is impossible or impractical to destroy information—for ex-
ample, because it is stored redundantly in many different loca-
tions—democratic information states strictly regulate its sub-
sequent use. If the information state is unable to forget, it is 
imperative that it be able to forgive. 
Democratic information states are also information phi-
lanthropists because they willingly distribute much valuable 
information they create to the public, in the form of education, 
scientific research, and agricultural and medical information. 
They allow the public access to information about their laws 
and their decision-making processes so that the public can hold 
government officials accountable if they act illegally or arbitra-
rily or are corrupt or inefficient. They avoid secret laws and se-
cret proceedings except where absolutely necessary. Democratic 
states recognize that access and disclosure help prevent gov-
ernments from manipulating their citizens. They protect indi-
vidual privacy because surveillance encourages abuses of power 
and inhibits freedom and democratic participation. Thus being 
an information gourmet and an information philanthropist are 
also connected: both help keep governments open and responsi-
ble to citizens; both further individual autonomy and democra-
cy by respecting privacy and promoting access to knowledge. 
 
 69. See WESTIN, supra note 68, at 23 (“The modern totalitarian state re-
lies on secrecy for the regime, but high surveillance and disclosure for other 
groups.”). 
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You might think the Fourth Amendment70 would be the 
most important constitutional provision for controlling and 
preventing abuses of power in the National Surveillance State. 
But courts have largely debilitated the Fourth Amendment to 
meet the demands of the Regulatory and Welfare States, the 
National Security State, and the War on Drugs.71 Much gov-
ernment collection and use of personal data now falls outside 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection—at least as the courts cur-
rently construe it. The Supreme Court has held that there is no 
expectation of privacy in business records and information that 
people give to third parties like banks and other businesses;72 
in the digital age this accounts for a vast amount of personal 
information. Most e-mail messages are copied onto privately 
held servers, making their protection limited if not non-
existent.73 Courts have also held that the Fourth Amendment 
poses few limits on foreign intelligence surveillance, which is 
largely regulated by FISA;74 as a result, the executive branch 
 
 70. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 71. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRI-
VACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 202 (2004) (noting that the Supreme Court 
has limited Fourth Amendment protections when faced with new practices 
and new technologies); Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Ad-
ministration: The Failure of the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 
HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1323 (1992) (arguing that the United States has failed to 
develop an appropriate law of data protection for the activist state); cf. Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 
393, 442, 444–46 (1995) (noting how strong privacy protections require strong 
limits on government and arguing that the rise of a powerful administrative 
state inevitably limited Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections). 
 72. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979) (holding that 
records of telephone numbers dialed are not subject to constitutional protec-
tion); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976) (holding that there is 
no expectation of privacy in bank records held by a third party). 
 73. See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 
36 F.3d 457, 460–64 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that stored e-mails not inter-
cepted contemporaneously with transmission are not protected under federal 
privacy laws). 
 74. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–1811 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2007), as amended by FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008); see also United States v. Truong 
Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913–15 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1980) (discussing the “for-
eign intelligence exception” to the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Bu-
tenko, 494 F.2d 593, 604–05 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc) (upholding presidential 
power to engage in warrantless surveillance to gather foreign intelligence in-
formation); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425–27 (5th Cir. 1973) (not-
ing that the President may authorize wiretaps for the purpose of foreign sur-
veillance); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 737–46 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) 
(holding that a FISA provision permitting government to conduct surveillance 
of agent of foreign power, if foreign intelligence is a “significant purpose” of 
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has increasingly justified domestic surveillance by asserting 
that it is a permissible byproduct of foreign intelligence gather-
ing.75 
Currently, governments are free to place cameras in public 
places like streets and parks because there is no expectation of 
privacy there.76 Governments can also collect information that 
people leave out in the open, like their presence on a public 
street; or abandon, like fingerprints, hair, or skin cells.77 More-
over, because the Fourth Amendment focuses on searches and 
seizures, it places few limits on collation and analysis, includ-
ing data mining.78 The Fourth Amendment does not require 
governments to discard any information they have already law-
fully collected. Digital files, once assembled, can be copied and 
augmented with new information indefinitely for later analysis 
and pattern matching. Finally, whatever constitutional limits 
might restrain government do not apply to private parties, who 
can freely collect, collate, and sell personal information back to 
the government free of Fourth Amendment restrictions, effec-
tively allowing an end-run around the Constitution. 
We should try to change some of the weaknesses in current 
Fourth Amendment doctrine. But legislative, administrative, 
 
such surveillance, did not violate Fourth Amendment). But cf. Zweibon v. Mit-
chell, 516 F.2d 594, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (noting the importance of 
judicial scrutiny to safeguard against illegal domestic surveillance of persons 
not associated with foreign countries). 
 75. Legal Authorities, supra note 64, at 1409–14. 
 76. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a sub-
ject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: 
Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. 
L.J. 213, 236 n.106 (2002) (listing cases holding that video surveillance by 
public cameras is not a search because there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy). 
 77. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (finding no ex-
pectation of privacy in trash in garbage bags left on the street); United States 
v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (collecting fingerprints not found to be a 
search); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (holding that items 
left in hotel room wastepaper basket were abandoned goods and government 
collection did not violate the Fourth Amendment). The precise question of how 
to deal with “abandoned DNA” is still open to debate. Compare Edward J. Im-
winkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 
WASH. L. REV. 413, 440 (2001) (“[T]he better course is to treat human cells left 
in public places like fingerprints . . . .”), with Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming 
“Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. 
L. REV. 857, 882–83 (2006) (conceding that there is probably no current Fourth 
Amendment protection but arguing for legislation regulating covert collection 
of DNA). 
 78. See SOLOVE, supra note 71, at 201; Slobogin, supra note 67, at 330–31. 
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and technological solutions may be far more important means 
of guaranteeing constitutional freedoms in the National Sur-
veillance State. These laws and technologies will probably do 
far more to enforce the constitutional values underlying the 
Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. 
Congress must pass new superstatutes to regulate the col-
lection, collation, purchase, and analysis of data. These new 
superstatutes would have three basic features. First, they 
would restrict the kinds of data governments may collect, col-
late, and use against people. They would strengthen the very 
limited protections of e-mail and digital business records, and 
rein in how the government purchases and uses data collected 
by private parties. They would institutionalize government 
“amnesia” by requiring that some kinds of data be regularly de-
stroyed after a certain amount of time unless there were good 
reasons for retaining the data. Second, the new superstatutes 
would create a code of proper conduct for private companies 
that collect, analyze, and sell personal information. Third, the 
new superstatutes would create a series of oversight mechan-
isms for executive bureaucracies that collect, purchase, process, 
and use information. 
Oversight of executive branch officials may be the single 
most important goal in securing freedom in the National Sur-
veillance State. Without appropriate checks and oversight me-
chanisms, executive officials will too easily slide into the bad 
tendencies that characterize authoritarian information states. 
They will increase secrecy, avoid accountability, cover up mis-
takes, and confuse their interest with the public interest. 
Recent events in the Bush administration suggest that leg-
islative oversight increasingly plays only a limited role in 
checking the executive. Meaningful oversight is most likely to 
occur only when there is divided government. Even then the 
executive will resist sharing any information about its internal 
processes or about the legal justifications for its decisions. A 
vast number of different programs affect personal privacy and 
it is unrealistic to expect that Congress can supervise them all. 
National security often demands that only a small number of 
legislators know about particularly sensitive programs and how 
they operate, which makes it easy for the administration to co-
opt them.79 The Bush administration’s history demonstrates 
 
 79. As Marty Lederman points out, the post-Watergate oversight system 
was designed to make Congress as well as the courts “effective check[s] 
against unfettered executive power.” Marty Lederman, Is There Any Way to 
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the many ways that Presidents can feign consultation with 
Congress without really doing so.80 
Judicial oversight need not require a traditional system of 
warrants. It could be a system of prior disclosure and explana-
tion and subsequent regular reporting and minimization. This 
is especially important as surveillance practices shift from op-
erations targeted at individual suspected persons to surveil-
 
Fix Legislative Oversight of Intelligence Operations?, BALKINIZATION, Mar. 31, 
2008, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/03/is-there-any-way-to-fix-legislative 
.html. However, as our current system has developed, Congress has found few 
ways of detecting and responding to executive misbehavior. The administra-
tion offers information only to a very small and select number of legislators. 
See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 
AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 242 (2007). Its messengers 
are professional intelligence and uniformed military officers with whom legis-
lators have already developed trusted relationships that they do not wish to 
undermine. Briefings are highly classified and often occur after questionable 
conduct has already begun, so that legislators are put in the difficult position 
of demanding a halt to existing programs that the administration claims are 
crucial for national security. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: 
LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 206 (2007). The ad-
ministration assures legislators that any legal questions have already been 
thoroughly vetted by administration lawyers (for example, in the Office of Le-
gal Counsel) without explaining the basis of the legal analysis in detail, offer-
ing competing arguments on the other side, or revealing the existence of dis-
senting views within the Executive branch. In addition, the administration 
tells legislators that they may not disclose what they learn about these pro-
grams to anyone, including their own staffs—much less any outside experts 
who might actually help them assess the legality and wisdom of the adminis-
tration’s conduct. That is because any discussions of the legality of administra-
tion practices would disclose classified information that might be useful to the 
enemy or otherwise compromise national security. As a result, legislators gen-
erally don't know what the problems are, and even if they suspect that they 
exist, there is very little they can do about them. See Marty Lederman, The 
Government Institution Most in Need of Comprehensive Reform, BALKINIZA-
TION, Dec. 9, 2007 http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/12/government-institution-
most-in-need-of.html. 
 80. See Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Ac-
tivities: Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1060 
(2008) (noting that recent controversies in the Bush administration show that 
“administrations do not necessarily comply with statutory directives to share 
information, and individual congresspersons may acquiesce in, even facilitate, 
such non-compliance.”). For recent reform proposals, see NAT’L COMM’N ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 419–23 
(2004) (arguing for reform of congressional oversight); Anne Joseph O’Connell, 
The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in 
the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1730–35 (2006) (arguing for in-
creased legislative oversight); Jack Goldsmith, The Laws in Wartime, SLATE, 
Apr. 2, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2187870/pagenum/2/ (presenting a list of 
proposals for continuing aggressive counterterrorism policies while increasing 
legislative oversight).  
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lance programs that do not begin with identified individuals 
and focus on matching and discovering patterns based on the 
analysis of large amounts of data and contact information.81 We 
need a set of procedures that translate the values of the Fourth 
Amendment (with its warrant requirement) and the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause82 into a new technological 
context. Currently, however, we exclude more and more execu-
tive action from judicial review on the twin grounds of secrecy 
and efficiency. The Bush administration’s secret NSA program 
is one example; the explosion in the use of administrative war-
rants that require no judicial oversight is another.83 Yet an in-
dependent judiciary plays an important role in making sure 
that zealous officials do not overreach. If the executive seeks 
greater efficiency, this requires a corresponding duty of greater 
disclosure before the fact and reporting after the fact to deter-
mine whether its surveillance programs are targeting the right 
people or are being abused. Judges must also counter the ex-
ecutive’s increasing use of secrecy and the state secrets privi-
lege to avoid accountability for its actions. Executive officials 
have institutional incentives to label their operations as secret 
and beyond the reach of judicial scrutiny. Unless legislatures 
 
 81. See Orin S. Kerr, Updating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 234 (2008) (noting that “today’s surveillance tends to 
be divorced from the identity and location of the parties to the communication” 
due to changes in communications technology). 
 82. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 83. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF 
THE FBI’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE 
ACTIONS AND EXAMINATION OF NSL USAGE IN 2006 158 (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0803b/final.pdf (finding expansion of use of 
national security letters against U.S. persons in a three-year period and de-
tailing abuses of the power to obtain records without a warrant); DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF 
SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS IN 2006 85 (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0803a/final.pdf (discussing instances in 
which the FBI received additional information that it was not authorized to 
receive by FISA court order); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 31–35 
(2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf (describ-
ing underreporting of number of NSL requests issued and number of legal vi-
olations); Electronic Privacy Information Center, National Security Letters 
(2008), http://epic.org/privacy/nsl/default.html; Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Se-
cret Scrutiny: In Hunt for Terrorists, Bureau Examines Records of Ordinary 
Americans, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1 (describing “an exponentially 
growing practice of domestic surveillance under the USA Patriot Act”); R. Jeff-
rey Smith, FBI Violations May Number 3,000, Official Says, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 21, 2007, at A7 (noting as many as 600 “cases of serious misconduct” in-
volving national security letters between 2003 and 2006). 
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and courts can devise effective procedures for inspecting and 
evaluating secret programs, the Presidency will become a law 
unto itself. 
Given the limits of legislative and judicial oversight, over-
sight within the executive branch will prove especially crucial. 
Congress can design institutional structures that require the 
executive to police itself and make regular reports about its 
conduct. For example, if Congress wants to bolster legal protec-
tions against warrantless surveillance, it might create a cadre 
of informational ombudsmen within the executive branch—
with the highest security clearances—whose job is to ensure 
that the government deploys information collection techniques 
legally and nonarbitrarily.84 Unfortunately, the Bush adminis-
tration has made extreme claims of inherent presidential power 
that it says allow it to disregard oversight and reporting me-
chanisms.85 Rejecting those claims about presidential power 
will be crucial to securing the rule of law in the National Sur-
veillance State. 
Finally, technological oversight will probably be an indis-
pensable supplement to legal procedures. The best way to con-
trol the watchers is to watch them as well. We should construct 
surveillance architectures so that government surveillance is 
regularly recorded and available for audit by ombudsmen and 
executive branch inspectors.86 Records of surveillance can, in 
 
 84. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Deci-
sionmaking in Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 96 (2008) (not-
ing importance of independent “embedded privacy experts” in Department of 
Homeland Security “specifically charged with advancing privacy among com-
peting agency interests, located in a central position within the agency deci-
sionmaking structure, drawing on internal relationships and external sources 
of power, and able to operate with relative independence”); cf. Neal Kumar Ka-
tyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch 
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2314–19 (2006) (arguing for mechanisms to 
create checks and balances within the executive branch in the foreign affairs 
area); Neal Kumar Katyal, Toward Internal Separation of Powers, 116 YALE 
L.J. 106 (Pocket Part 2006) (same). 
 85. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 79, at 123–26, 202–10; SAVAGE, supra 
note 79, at 132–34; Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President to Do? Interpreting 
the Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
395, 400–01 (2008) (discussing the Bush administration’s decision not to comp-
ly with some federal statutes based on a theory of broad executive authority); 
Marty Lederman, The Theory of a Preclusive Commander-in-Chief Power is 
Alive and Well, BALKINIZATION, Jan. 30, 2008, http://balkin.blogspot 
.com/2008/01/theory-of-preclusive-commander-in-chief.html. 
 86. See, e.g., DEROSA, supra note 65, at 19 (discussing audit technology as 
a method of protecting privacy and preventing abuse); TECHNOLOGY & PRIVA-
CY ADVISORY COMM., supra note 65, at 50–52 (recommending audit systems 
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turn, be subjected to data analysis and pattern matching to dis-
cover any unusual behavior that suggests abuse of procedures. 
These technological audits can automate part of the process of 
oversight; they can assist ombudsmen, executive officials, Con-
gress, and the courts in ensuring that surveillance practices 
stay within legal bounds. We can prevent some kinds of abuse 
by technological design; at the very least, technology can force 
disclosure of information that executive officials would other-
wise keep hidden. 
The Administrative and Welfare States raised problems 
not only for the Constitution, but also for the rule of law itself. 
The same is true for the National Surveillance State. Changing 
methods of governance demand new strategies to preserve con-
stitutional values and democratic self-government. We mas-
tered at least some of the problems caused by the rise of the 
Administrative and Welfare States; we must hope that we can 
do so the same for the National Surveillance State, which is al-
ready here. 
 
for data mining programs); Kozlovski, supra note 48, at 126–28 (arguing for 
technological systems of accountable policing, including logging of information 
collected, who has access to it and what searches have been performed); Ru-
binstein et al., supra note 56, at 269 (“[A]n audit system is needed to provide a 
complete and tamper-proof record of the searches that have been conducted 
and the identity of the analysts involved.”).  
 
